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Summary 
Merger control is one of the instruments of EU competition law that is 
intended to protect competition in the Internal market and counteract possible 
distortion by concentrations.  
The jurisdictional test used in the European Merger Regulation no. 139/2004 
(“the EUMR”) is a threshold test. This threshold test is based on the turnover 
of the merging parties and the geographical location of said turnover.  
As is natural in a dynamic field of law like merger law, discussions arise 
regarding the regulations and established case law in the field. From the 7th 
of October 2016 until the 13th of January 2017 the Commission sought 
feedback in a public consultation regarding several suggested changes to the 
EUMR. One suggested change is to the current threshold criteria. According 
to the Commission there is a possible legal gap when it comes to mergers and 
acquisitions of undertakings that don’t have a large enough turnover to fall 
under the current thresholds but might still have large market power. 
To be able to understand this issue some aspects of merger control in the 
European Union must be examined. They are; how concentrations are defined 
under the EUMR, the current turnover thresholds and how the Commission’s 
jurisdiction is found in the EUMR. The Commission’s suggestions aim at 
widening this jurisdiction. When assessing if there is a need for widening the 
jurisdiction it is relevant too look at the referral mechanisms found in the 
EUMR. They allow, under certain circumstances, for cases that fall outside 
the jurisdiction of the EUMR to be referred to the Commission. There are also 
options, where cases that fall inside the jurisdiction of the EUMR, can be 
referred to Member States’ national competition law authorities. When these 
options have been considered, as well as the reasoning behind them, it 
becomes apparent that, if any reforms should be made to the EUMR to widen 
the jurisdiction, it should be done with the utmost caution.  
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Abbreviations 
BA British Airways Plc 
bmi British Midlands Limited 
EC European Commission  
EUMR  The European Merger Regulation – 
the Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 of 20 January 2004  
IAG International Consolidated Airlines 
Group 
IB Opco Iberia Líneas Aéréas de España, 
Sociedad Anónima Operadora 
LH Deutsche Lufthansa AG 
LHBD LHBD Holding Limited 
NCA National Competition Authorities 
SIEC Significant Impediment of Effective 
Competition 
SNE Spanish National Entity 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Subject Matter and Background 
Jurisdiction has always been an interesting and debated topic in EU-law. That 
is not surprising, considering that the European Union is an economic and 
political union of 28 sovereign countries. EU-competition law is no different.  
One of the main pillars of EU-competition law is merger control. To be able 
to regulate changes in market structure the Council adopted a European 
Merger Control Regulation. The one currently in force is the European 
Merger Regulation no. 139/2004 (“EUMR”). In the EUMR concentrations 
with a Community Dimension that would significantly impede effective 
competition in the Internal market or a substantial part of it, in particular as a 
result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, are declared 
incompatible with the Internal market.1 
This thesis will discuss the thresholds used to decide whether a concentration 
with a Community Dimension should be deemed to exist in accordance to the 
EUMR and, by doing so, whether that concentration falls under its 
jurisdiction.2 
After a public consultation in 20133 and a report in 20094, the Commissions 
White Paper “Towards more effective merger control”, published in Brussels 
on the 7th of July 2014, the Commission took stock of how the substantive 
test of “significant impediment of effective competition” (“SIEC”) had been 
applied as well as suggesting proposals for specific amendments that were 
meant to make the EU merger control more effective.5 Based on the White 
Paper, the Commission invited interested stakeholders to respond to a public 
consultation to seek feedback on, among other things, the effectiveness of the 
turnover-based jurisdictional thresholds of the EUMR.  
The EUMR only applies to concentrations with a Community Dimension, that 
is, where the concerned undertakings meet relevant turnover thresholds. The 
reason why this is now in the spotlight is that a debate has risen concerning 
                                                 
1 Alison Jones, Brenda Sufrin EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (6th 
Edition OPU 2016), p. 1084. 
2 Reg. 139/2004 [2004] OJ L24/1. 
3 Commission staff working document “Towards more effective EU merger control” 
published in Brussels 25.06.2013.  
4 Communication from the Commission to the Council - Report on the functioning of 
Regulation No 139/2004. Published in Brussels, 18.06.2017.  
5 White Paper Towards more effective EU merger control (Text with EEA relevance) 
published 9.7.2014, p. 4. 
  6 
whether these thresholds are effective enough because they might not capture 
all transactions that could have an impact on the Internal market.6 
Is this the case? Are reforms necessary? Are there mergers, where the relevant 
undertakings don’t meet the relevant turnover thresholds, that have such a big 
impact on the Internal market that they should by all rights fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Commissions merger control? These questions seem 
particularly relevant concerning undertakings in the digital and 
pharmaceutical industries where an acquired company, while not having 
generated high turnovers might still be of competitive importance. This could 
be because of considerable market potential or commercially valuable data.7 
One of the Commissions merger cases highlighting these types of 
concentrations was the acquisition in 2014 of WhatsApp by Facebook, which 
fell outside the thresholds of Article 1 of the EUMR but was ultimately 
referred to the Commission pursuant to Article 4(5) thereof.8  
Questions have arisen whether changes should also be made to the EUMR 
with regards to minority shareholdings, for similar reasons as to why it has 
been suggested that changes should be made to the current thresholds.  
The Commission is also considering the question of whether its powers under 
Article 8(4) should be amended to allow it to require the dissolution of 
partially implemented transactions declared incompatible with the Internal 
market in line with the scope of the suspension obligation.9 This issue can 
however not be discussed in this thesis in any detail due to space constraints.  
1.2 Research Approach 
This thesis aims to examine a few aspects of merger control in the EU to 
inspect the effectiveness of the turnover-based jurisdictional thresholds of the 
EUMR. 
In order to do this, a few aspects of Merger control will be examined; the 
concept of concentrations, the current judicial control of the EU and referral 
options found in the EUMR. To do so the research questions will be as 
follows:  
                                                 
6 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2016_merger_control/index_en.html 
accessed 06.02.2017. 
7 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2016_merger_control/index_en.html 
accessed 06.02.2017. 
8 FACEBOOK / WHATSAPP (C(2014) 7239) COMP/M.7217 [2014]. 
9 This was suggested as a result of the Case No COMP/M.4439 – Ryanair / Aer Lingus 
[2010] ECR II-3691 where Ryanair had already acquired a non-controlling minority 
shareholding in Aer Lingus. Even though the Commission didn’t allow the merger it could 
not order the divestiture of Ryanair’s already acquired non-controlling minority 
shareholding in Aer Lingus pursuant to Article 8(4). See White Paper, Towards a more 
effective EU merger control, COM(2014) 449 Final.  
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1. How are concentrations defined in the EUMR, the Commission’s and 
the General Court’s case law?  
2. How is the current judicial control and why should it be changed?  
3. What are the exclusive competences of the Commission, how can 
cases be referred and what impact can that have on merger control?  
1.3 Method and materials 
To answer the research questions a legal dogmatic method is applied based 
on the theory of legal sources. This is done to clarify and establish what the 
applicable law is and the researched and specified field of law. This is 
determined by analysing the current law and reviewing historical changes in 
the law. To specify the scope of the relevant Union law, the case law of the 
Court of justice and case law of the General Court and decisions of the 
Commission, are examined. The most relevant Union law for investigation 
for this thesis is the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 
2004. 
As there are not many cases, that have come before the Court of Justice, that 
directly connect with the issues of this thesis, references are made to several 
of the Commission’s notices that have been issued about the EUMR. Despite 
only being guidelines, that in no way limit the interpretation of the Court of 
Justice or the General Court, they have clear value as sources of law, partly 
because they have been made on the foundation of the Commission’s practise, 
noted by the fact that the Commission refers to its own decisions which shows 
that the Commission itself finds itself bound to follow these guidelines. 
Because of its relevance to the subject of the thesis, Commissioner 
Vestanger’s speech from the 10th of March 2016 will also be discussed, as 
well as the Commission’s questionnaire for public consultation that was open 
from the 7th of October 2016 until the 13th of January 2017. Further analysis 
of the topic was aided with academic literature.  
Due to the nature of the objective of this thesis, economic issues and ideas 
might influence the conclusions made. This is difficult to escape as 
competition law revolves around making sure that undertakings operating in 
the free market economy don’t hinder optimal function of the market by 
acting anti-competitively.10  
                                                 
10 Alison Jones, Brenda Sufrin EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (6th 
Edition OPU 2016), p. 1. 
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1.4 Delimitations  
Due to space limitations, this thesis will be limited to reviewing the current 
EUMR while touching upon its development and connected case law. This 
means that the connection of the thesis subject to Article 101 and Article 102 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to national 
merger laws will not be studied in greater detail.  
Even with this limitation there is still enough content to be found to write 
something much more comprehensive than a thesis, of this length, can be. So, 
to limit the scope of the discussion even further, regardless of the strong 
connection to the subject, there will not be a chance to delve into minority 
shareholding or the Commission’s powers under Article 8(4) of the EUMR.  
  9 
2 Merger Control in the EU  
Merger control in the EU is relatively new. Until 1990 the Commission had 
to rely on its power to apply Articles 102 and 101 to prevent firms from taking 
over or acquiring shares in other firms. The first merger regulation was 
adopted in 1989 and took force in 1990, a second, amends was made in 1997, 
which was consolidated into a new regulation in 2004: the EUMR.11  
The operations, to which the Merger regulation applies, are defined by a two-
fold test. First, the operation must be a concentration within the meaning of 
Article 3. The second one comprises the turnover thresholds that can be found 
in Article 1. The next couple of chapters will define these concepts and how 
they have developed within EU law.  
2.1 Concentrations  
Concentrations are defined in Article 3(1) of the EUMR as either the true 
merger of undertakings, or the situation where one or more undertakings, 
directly or indirectly, acquire control over one or more other undertakings.  
A concentration is perhaps more commonly known as a merger. A true merger 
would be when two separate undertakings merge entirely into a new entity, 
but this is not the only way that the expression “merger” is understood. When 
used with regards to competition policy it includes a much wider range of 
corporate transactions. A merger could be the result of a change in control by 
an acquisition of majority shares, for example.12 The acquisition of 
intellectual property assets could also amount to a merger as well as 
undertakings merging part of their business into a separate joint venture 
company.13 By reason of simplicity and ease of reading, the term “merger” 
will be used in this thesis to encompass all of these possibilities unless context 
necessitates otherwise. As the EUMR is such an integral part of this thesis the 
expression “concentration” will sometimes also be used. 
Mergers can have a lasting and permanent change on the market. Two 
competitors becoming a single entity might, for example, cause a decline in 
competition within that particular market. In this lies the purpose of merger 
control, it is to enable competition authorities to regulate changes in market 
                                                 
11 Alison Jones, Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (6th 
Edition OPU 2016), p. 1084. 
12 Richard Whish, David Bailey Competition Law (8th Edition OPU 2015), p. 853. 
13 Richard Whish, David Bailey Competition Law (8th Edition OPU 2015), p. 854.  
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structure by deciding whether two or more commercial companies may 
merge, combine or consolidate their business into one.14  
The declared aim of the EU merger control system is to ensure effective 
competition in the Internal market or parts of it.15 Since the first Merger 
Regulation was adopted in 1989 EU merger control has become one of the 
main pillars of EU competition law and its basic features have become well 
established.16 The EUMR has been reviewed regularly and a re-cast of it was 
adopted in 2004. There the SIEC test was introduced into the regulation as a 
relevant criterion for examining mergers and the possibilities for referring 
merger cases from Member States to the Commission and vice versa were 
enhanced.17 In the Commission’s White Paper the EU merger control is 
described as:  
 “…making an important contribution to the functioning of 
the internal market, both by providing a harmonized set of 
rules for concentrations and corporate restructuring and 
by ensuring that competition and thus consumers are not 
harmed by economic concentration in the marketplace.”18  
The EU authorities have been hostile towards anticompetitive agreements that 
have been concluded between independent undertakings. As mergers can 
have even more permanent and lasting changes on the market than 
agreements, one could expect that many mergers would be prohibited.19  
When considering this, it is important to note that mergers are not all bad. 
There are many reasons for firms to merge and most of them are not harmful 
to the economy but beneficial. These are e.g. economies of scale and scope 
but also the chance for a business owner to sell the business. This means that 
competition authorities must determine whether a merger will have such an 
adverse effect on competition that any possible resulting benefits from the 
suggested merger are cancelled out or should be ignored.20 
As might be understood by the word, mergers necessarily involve at least two 
undertakings. Therefore, the starting point in Article 3(1)(a) of the EUMR is 
                                                 
14 Alison Jones, Brenda Sufrin. EU Competition Law. Text, Cases and Materials. (5th 
Edition OPU 2014), p. 1129. 
15 Commission staff working document Impact assessment Accompanying the document 
White Paper published 9.7.2014, p. 10. 
16 White Paper Towards more effective EU merger control (Text with EEA relevance) 
published 9.7.2014, p. 4. 
17 Commission staff working document Impact assessment Accompanying the document 
White Paper published 9.7.2014, p. 10. 
18 White Paper Towards more effective EU merger control (Text with EEA relevance) 
published 9.7.2014, p. 4. 
19 Alison Jones, Brenda Sufrin. EU Competition Law. Text, Cases and Materials. (5th 
Edition OPU 2014), p. 1129. 
20 Richard Whish, David Bailey Competition Law (8th Edition OPU 2015), p. 857-858. 
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that a merger involves two or more previously independent undertakings. 
Subparagraph (b) of the same article also allows for mergers to be when an 
owner of an undertaking acquires control of another. Yet there is no specific 
definition of what an “undertaking” is in the EUMR. It must thus be assumed 
that the concept should be understood broadly so that it can include an entity 
that carries out some kind of economic activity in any type of corporate form. 
It must also be assumed that the case law of the Court of Justice and the 
General Court (formerly known as the Court of First Instance), where the 
definition of an “undertaking” is interpreted with respect to article 101 and 
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), 
applies to how the concept of “undertaking” should be applied in the 
EUMR.21  
2.1.1 Article 3(1) – Mergers Between Two 
Previously Independent Undertakings  
Article 3(1) of the EUMR provides:  
1. A concentration shall be deemed to arise where a change 
of control on a lasting basis results from: 
(a) the merger of two or more previously independent 
undertakings or parts of undertakings, or 
(b) the acquisition, by one or more persons already 
controlling at least one undertaking, or by one or more 
undertakings, whether by purchase of securities or assets, 
by contract or by any other means, of direct or indirect 
control of the whole or parts of one or more other 
undertakings. 
That means that according to Article 3(1) there is a concentration only when 
a change of control in the undertakings concerned occurs on a lasting basis. 
Recital 20 of the preamble to the EUMR further explains that the concept of 
concentration is intended to relate to operations which bring about a lasting 
change in the structure of the market. What is also important to note is that, 
because Article 3 revolves around the concept of control, the existence of a 
concentration is decidedly determined by qualitive instead of quantitative 
criteria.22  
                                                 
21 Air France/Sabena IV/M.157 [1992] OJ C272/0, para. 11c. 
22 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01) published 
16.4.2008, paras. 7-8. 
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The first category of concentrations defined in Article 3(1), a merger between 
two previously independent undertakings, occurs when two or more 
independent undertakings combine to make a new undertaking and, by doing 
so, cease to exist as separate legal entities or when an undertaking is absorbed 
by another. A merger within the meaning of the first category can also occur 
where the combination of the activities of previously independent 
undertakings results in the creation of a single economic unit.23 For this type 
of combination to be considered a merger there must be permanent, single 
economic management. The de facto merge may be solely based on 
contractual arrangements24, but it can also be reinforced by cross-
shareholdings between the undertakings forming the economic unit.25  
Article 3(1)(b) states that a concentration occurs in the case of an acquisition 
of control. Such control may be acquired by a single undertaking or by several 
undertakings working together. Control can also be acquired by a person, if 
that person (whether it be solely or jointly) controls at least one other 
undertaking.  
‘Person’ has been extended to include public bodies26 and private entities, as 
well as natural persons. If a natural person acquires control it is only 
considered to bring about lasting change in structure of the undertaking 
affected if the natural persons carries out further economic activities on their 
own account or if they control another undertaking.2728 
Control of an undertaking can be acquired in several stages by means of one 
or more transactions, provided that the end result constitutes a single 
concentration. That means that a concentration may be deemed to arise where 
a number of formally distinct legal transactions are interdependent so that 
none of them would be carried out without the others and the result consists 
                                                 
23 AstraZeneca/Novartis COMP/M.1806 [2000]. 
24 Price Waterhouse/Coopers&Lybrand (C(1998) 1388) IV/M.1016 [1998]; Ernst & 
Young/Andersen Germany (SG (2002) D/231406/407/408) M.2824 [2002].  
25 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01) published 
16.4.2008, para. 10. 
26 Including the State itself, e.g. Air France/Sabena IV/M.157 [1992] OJ C272/0 in relation 
to the Belgian State, or other public bodies such as the Treuhandanstalt Kali und 
Salz/MDK/Treuhand IV/M.308 [1993] OJ L186/38, as well as recital 22 of the Merger 
Regulation.  
27 Asko/Jakobs/Adia IV/M.82 [1991]including a private person as undertaking concerned; 
Apax/Travelex (SG-Greffe(2005) D/202673 ) M3762 [2005] where a private person 
acquiring joint control was not considered an undertaking concerned this can also be seen 
in the Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01) published 
16.4.2008, para. 13. 
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of conferring, on one or more undertakings, direct or indirect economic 
control over activities of another.29  
Because control is defined in Article 3(2) as the possibility of exercising 
decisive influence on an undertaking it is not necessary to show that the 
decisive influence is or will be actually exercised. The possibility of 
exercising decisive influence on an undertaking must be effective though it 
does not need to be exercised in order to exist.30 This kind of control can be 
reached through the acquisition of property rights, assets, through shareholder 
agreements or may result from economic dependence. Hence it is not 
indispensable that a controlling interest has been acquired.31  
2.1.1.1 Sole control 
Sole control is acquired if one undertaking alone can take decisions regarding 
an undertaking. This can happen on a de jure or a de facto basis. Ordinarily 
this happens when an undertaking achieves a decisive influence through 
acquiring more than 50 percent of the share capital and with it more than 50 
percent of the majority of the voting rights of another undertaking.32 
However, every case must be examined as this is not always a prerequisite to 
acquiring sole control. In some cases, an undertaking with more than 50 
percent of the share capital will not acquire share control because it does not 
have control of a majority of voting rights or because a supermajority is 
needed to decide on strategic issues. Minority shareholding can also result in 
sole control, where special rights are attributed to some shares, e.g. where the 
majority of voting rights are nonetheless allotted to the shareholder. Sole 
control can also be acquired on a de facto basis like when the remainder of 
shares is widely dispersed.33  
This was a factor that the Commission had to consider in the proposed 
acquisition of Aer Lingus by Ryanair.34 The proposed transaction concerned 
the acquisition of sole control by Ryanair of Aer Lingus by way of public bid 
for all outstanding shares not already acquired.  
Ryanair started to acquire a substantial number of shares of Aer Lingus on 
the 27th of September 2006 and by the 5th of October the same year it had 
acquired 19.16 percent of the share capital of Aer Lingus. On that day, 
Ryanair announced a public bid for the entire share capital of Aer Lingus. By 
                                                 
29 Case T-282/02, Cementbouw Handel &Industrie BV v. Commission [2006] ECR II-319, 
paras. 104-109. See also footnote 81, Alison Jones, Brenda Sufrin. EU Competition Law. 
Text, Cases and Materials (5th Edition OPU 2014), p. 114.1 
30 Case T-282/02 Cementbouw v Commission, [2006] ECR II-319, para. 58. 
31 Alison Jones, Brenda Sufrin. EU Competition Law. Text, Cases and Material (5th Edition 
OPU 2014 ), p. 1141. 
32 Alison Jones, Brenda Sufrin. EU Competition Law. Text, Cases and Materials (5th 
Edition OPU 2014), p. 1142. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ryanair/Aer Lingus (C(2007) 3104) COMP/M.4439 [2010] ECR II-3691. 
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the 28th of November 2006 Ryanair held 25.17 percent of the share capital in 
Aer Lingus and confirmed that this was all part of a plan to acquire control of 
Aer Lingus.  
When the timeline of the acquisition of shares was considered, as well as 
Ryanair’s explanations of the meaning of the acquisition, the entire operation 
comprising the acquisition of shares before and during the public bid period 
and the public bid itself was considered to constitute a single concentration 
within the meaning of Article 3 of the Merger Regulation. 
The Commission didn’t find that sole control was acquired by Ryanair with 
the 25 percent shareholding and did not consider that it could require Ryanair 
to divest this non-controlling stake it had already acquired.35 
In Case T-411/07, Aer Lingus Group v. Commission [2010] ECR II – 3691, 
the General Court agreed with the Commission on this. Finding that because 
control had not been obtained and the shareholdings, as such, did not confer 
the power of exercising decisive influence on the other undertaking on a 
lasting basis, there was no change of control. The General Court also found 
that the Commission is not granted the power under the EUMR to require an 
undertaking to divest shareholding under these conditions because:  
“According to the actual terms used in Article 8(4) of the 
regulation, the power to require the disposal of all the 
shares acquired by an undertaking in another undertaking 
exists only ‘to restore the situation prevailing prior to the 
implementation of the concentration’. If control has not 
been acquired, the Commission does not have the power to 
dissolve the concentration. If the legislature had wished to 
grant the Commission broader powers than those laid 
down in the merger regulation, it would have enacted a 
provision to that effect.”36 
There was no concentration when Ryanair bought the first 25 percent shares 
because there was no lasting change of control and so the Commission did 
not have powers to require the disposal of the shares.  
2.1.1.2 Joint control  
As was discussed previously, sole control is not the only way where the 
EUMR can apply to transactions which lead to a concentration. The 
Commission explains joint control in its consolidated Jurisdictional notice 
from 2008, to be where two or more undertakings or persons have the 
                                                 
35 Alison Jones, Brenda Sufrin. EU Competition Law. Text, Cases and Materials. (5th 
Edition OPU 2014), p. 1143. 
36 T-411/07, Aer Lingus Group v. Commission [2010] ECR II – 3691, paras. 63-66. 
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possibility of exercising decisive influence over another undertaking.37 This 
is unlike sole control because with two or more undertakings there is a 
possibility of a deadlock situation resulting from the power of two or more 
parent companies to reject the strategic decisions.  
This is clearest when there are only two parent companies and they share the 
voting rights equally between them in the joint venture. Equality is not 
necessary though and joint control may exist even where there is no equality 
between the two parent companies in votes, in representation in decision-
making bodies or where there are more than two parent companies. This can 
be done when minority shareholders have veto rights that are related to 
strategic decisions on the business policy. That means that the rights of the 
minority shareholders are related to decisions on the essence of the joint 
venture.38  
In the Commission Case Eridania/ISI39, the Commission considered whether 
an acquisition of shares by Eridania in Finbieticola, that brought its holdings 
in ISI from 50% to 65 %, was compatible with the common market.  
Even though this concentration brought about a high combined market on the 
Italian sugar market (the affected market) the Commission considered the 
markets sensitivity to price increases. A one percent price increase of sugar 
in Italy a year before the decision was made was accompanied by a 100% 
increase in imports.  
Another deciding factor was the Commission’s assessment of the operations 
before the merger would occur. Eridania already played a key role in the 
determination and running of ISI’s commercial activities. That meant that, 
from a competition point of view, the acquisition did not significantly modify 
the horizontal relationship between Eridania and ISI and thus not the 
conditions on the market.  
Consequently, the Commission found that the concentration didn’t raise 
serious doubts with regards to the compatibility with the common market and 
it was declared compatible in application of Article 6(1)b of the EUMR. 
When determining changes like this the crucial element is that the veto rights 
are enough to enable exercise of influential control related to strategic 
                                                 
37 Commission Notice on the concept of concentration under Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings published 02.03.1998 OJ 
C66/5, para. 20-22. 
38 Commission Notice on the concept of concentration under Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings published 02.03.1998 OJ 
C66/5, para. 20-22. 
39 Eridania/ISI Case No IV/M.062 [1991] OJ L2985. 
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decisions. It is not necessary to establish whether the acquirer will make use 
of such possible control.40  
When the Commission assesses whether a ‘concentration’ has occurred 
according to the EUMR, it is paramount that each case is assessed. Even 
though there are some rules of thumb that can indicate change of control on a 
lasting basis, like acquisition of the majority of shares for example, it is not 
always that simple.  
2.1.2 Joint Ventures 
Article 3(1)(b) provides that a concentration shall be presumed to arise where 
control is acquired by one or more undertakings of the whole or parts of the 
undertaking. Whether the acquisition would lead to sole control of an 
undertaking or a joint control of an undertaking, it would lead to a structural 
change in the relevant market.41  
Article 3(4) then states that:  
The creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting 
basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity 
shall constitute a concentration within the meaning of 
paragraph 3(1)(b) 
The full-functioning criterion found in this Article defines the application of 
the EUMR for the creation of joint ventures by the parties. This full-
functioning criterion does not mean that it must be completely autonomous 
from the undertakings that created it. The venture only needs to be 
economically autonomous from an operational viewpoint. Strategic decisions 
could still be made by the creating undertakings. If this was not the case then 
jointly controlled undertakings could never be considered full-functioning 
and would therefore never fall under the condition in Article 3(4).  
To be full-functioning the joint venture must have its own access and presence 
on the market. This means that where a joint venture is essentially limited to 
one specific function of the parent companies’ business activities will not 
fulfil this criteria for example, in joint ventures that are limited to production.  
To assess whether the joint venture can be considered economically 
autonomous from an operational view point it has to be demonstrated that the 
joint venture will supply its goods or services to the purchasers who value 
                                                 
40 Commission Notice on the concept of concentration under Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings published 02.03.1998 OJ 
C66/5, para. 23. 
41 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01) published 
16.4.2008, para. 91. 
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them most and will pay most and that the joint venture will also deal with its 
parents’ companies on the basis of normal commercial conditions.42  
2.1.3 Exceptions 
In Article 3(5) three exceptional situations are set out where the acquisition 
of a controlling interest does not constitute a concentration under the Merger 
Regulation. They deal with shares held by financial institutions on a 
temporary basis, the acquisition of control by liquidators or other 
administrators and operations carried out by financial holding companies.43 
The exceptions under Article 3(5) of the EUMR only apply to a limited field. 
Which is if the operation would otherwise be a concentration independently. 
This would not be the case if the transaction is part of a broader, single 
concentration, where the final acquirer of control would not fall within the 
terms of Article 3(5). For example, when an undertaking is ‘parked’ with an 
interim buyer, like a bank, on the basis of an agreement on the later sale of 
the business to the final acquirer.44 
The exceptions also do not apply to normal investment fund structures. Of 
course, it depends on the objective of the funds but they generally don’t limit 
themselves in the exercise of voting rights, but adopt decisions to appoint the 
members of the management and the supervisory bodies of the undertakings 
or even restructure the undertakings. This is not compatible with the 
requirements under both Article 3(5)(a) and (c) that the acquiring companies 
do not exercise voting rights with a view to determine the competitive conduct 
of the other undertakings.45 
2.1.4 Abandonment of Concentration 
If the undertakings concerned abandon the concentration it ceases to exist and 
the EUMR does not apply to the concentration. If the Commission has 
initiated proceedings under the first sentence of Article 6(1)(c), though those 
proceedings must be closed, without prejudice to Article 9, by means of a 
decision as provided for in Article 8. Undertakings can escape this by 
demonstrating to the satisfaction of the Commission, that they have 
                                                 
42 Zeneca/Vanderhave IV/M.556 [1996] OJ C188/10. 
43 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01) published 
16.4.2008, paras. 110-118. 
44 ibid. 
45 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01) published 
16.4.2008, paras. 114-115. 
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abandoned the concentration. This obligation was introduced with the revised 
EUMR 139/2004. 4647  
In the Commission’s Jurisdictional Notice from 2008 guidance is set out as 
to how the parties can demonstrate that the practice has been abandoned. 
There it is explained that the proof of abandonment must correlate with the 
original act that was considered sufficient to make the concentration 
notifiable. It is not considered adequate proof to withdraw the notification so 
that the concentration has been abandoned in the sense of Article 6(1)(c).48 
This shows that an abandonment of a merger is not something that can be 
used to escape the jurisdiction of the Commission.  
2.1.5 Relation between Article 3 and Article 
5(2) second subparagraph  
Several transactions can be treated as a single concentration under Article 3 
of the EUMR but there is also a specific provision in Article 5(2) second 
subparagraph that allows for it as well.49 
In Article 3 a ‘concentration’ is defined in general and material terms but the 
question of the Commissions competence in respect of concentrations is not 
directly determined. Article 5 is intended to specify the scope of the EUMR, 
this is done by defining the turnover to be taken into account to see whether 
a concentration has a Community Dimension.50 
Article 5(2) second subparagraph then provides:  
However, two or more transactions within the meaning of 
the first subparagraph which take place within a two-year 
period between the same persons or undertakings shall be 
treated as one and the same concentration arising on the 
date of the last transaction 
This means that the Commission can consider two or more concentrative 
transactions to constitute a single concentration for the purposes of 
calculating the turnover of the undertakings concerned. This answers the 
question of whether a number of transactions give rise to a single 
                                                 
46 Reg. 139/2004 [2004] OJ L24/1 Article 6(1)(c).  
47 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01) published 
16.4.2008, para. 118. 
48 Alison Jones, Brenda Sufrin. EU Competition Law. Text, Cases and Materials. (5th 
Edition OPU 2014), p. 1142. 
49 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01) published 
16.4.2008, para. 36. 
50 The defninition of Community Dimension will be discussed later in this thesis.  
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concentration or whether those transactions must be regarded as giving rise 
to a number of concentrations.51  
Article 5(2), subparagraph 2 provides for a specific period of time where 
successive transactions can be considered as a single concentration. This is to 
prevent transactions being broken down into series of sales of assets over a 
period of time with the aim of avoiding the competence conferred on the 
Commission by the EUMR.  
The definition of a concentration in Article 3(1) implies that it makes no 
difference whether a concentration was acquired by one or several different 
legal transactions if, in the end, there is a single concentration by the end. This 
is not always clear but, to be able to determine the unitary nature of the 
transactions in question, the Commission must, for each case, ascertain 
whether the transactions are so linked that one would not have been carried 
out without the other.52  
This can also be deduced from recital 20 to the EUMR and is likewise set out 
by the Court of First Instance in the Cementbouw judgment.53 In the 
Commission’s Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice from 2008, this is 
explained to mean that under the EUMR, transactions that depend on each 
other according to the economic objectives of the subjective parties, should 
be analysed in one procedure. If different transactions are independent of each 
other however, then they should be assessed individually under the EUMR.54 
Several transactions that are linked by condition upon each other can also 
only be treated as a single concentration if control is ultimately acquired by 
the same undertaking(s). This means that e.g. when two companies de-merge 
a joint venture, the transactions that result will be considered as separate 
concentrations or, when an undertaking sells a business, and then acquires the 
seller, including the business sold, would again also have to be considered as 
separate concentrations.55  
                                                 
51 Judgment in Case T-282/02 Cementbouw v Commission, paragraphs 104-109 [2006] 
ECR II-319. See also Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(2008/C 95/01) published 16.4.2008, para. 36. 
52 Judgment in Case T-282/02 Cementbouw v Commission, paragraphs 104-109 [2006] 
ECR II-319. See also Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(2008/C 95/01), paras. 38-39. 
53 Judgment in Case T-282/02 Cementbouw v Commission, [2006] ECR II-319, paras. 106-
109. 
54 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01) published 
16.4.2008, paras. 40-41. 
55 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01) published 
16.4.2008, paras. 43. 
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2.2 Current judicial control 
One way of deciding which mergers should be examined by the competition 
authorities is to have jurisdictional thresholds that the merging companies 
need to cross to be likely to have effect on the relevant market. The current 
EUMR relies on thresholds that are based on the annual turnover of the 
merging companies. There are, however, other ways in which jurisdiction 
might be determined, e.g. jurisdiction may be determined by reference to the 
market shares of parties, as is the case is in Spain and Portugal.56  
If a merger has or is regarded to have a ‘Community Dimension’ in principle 
it must be notified to the Commission. The Commission then has exclusive 
jurisdiction to investigate the transaction and the National Competition 
Authorities (‘NCA’) are precluded from, with some exceptions, applying 
their national control rules. This has been called the ‘One-stop principle’ and 
is set out in Article 21(2) and (3) as well as Recitals (8) and (11) of the EUMR. 
If a merger does however not have an ‘Community Dimension’ then it is 
subject to the NCAs review under the national merger control and the 
Commission does not have any jurisdiction to investigate.57 
As the notification of concentrations with a Community Dimension is 
compulsory and usually limited to the jurisdiction of the EUMR, the 
jurisdictional test incorporated in the EUMR is supposed to be a bright line 
test, one that can be applied quite easily, simply and objectively.58  
2.2.1 Community Dimension  
When Regulation 4064/89 was first revised, the amending regulation 
introduced changes to the scope of the regulation. One of the most significant 
changes to Regulation 4064/89 were the turnover thresholds.59 They are 
objectively quantifiable criteria that depend on the respective turnovers of the 
undertakings concerned at the date of the transaction or it’s notification.6061 
                                                 
56 Note 124 Alison Jones, Brenda Sufrin. EU Competition Law. Text, Cases and Materials. 
(5th Edition OPU 2014), p. 1149. 
57 Bellamy and Child. European Union Law of Competition (7th edition), p. 522. 
58 Alison Jones, Brenda Sufrin. EU Competition Law. Text, Cases and Materials (5th 
Edition OPU 2014), p. 1149. 
59 Ioannis Kokkoris, Howard Shelanski. EU Merger Control: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis (OPU 2014), p. 30-31. 
60 Bellamy and Child. European Union Law of Competition (7th edition), p.547. 
61 The relevant date of established jurisdiction for the Commission is either the conclusion 
of the binding agreement, the announcement of the public bid or the date of the first 
notification to the Commission or a Member State’s NCA where the parties give good faith 
intention that they will conclude such an agreement or make such a bid. See Bellamy and 
Child. European Union Law of Competition (7th edition) p.572-573. In Case C-202/06P 
Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission [2007] ECR I-12129, [2008] 4 CMLR 
1324 The Court of Justice held that the Commissions jurisdiction must be decided at a fixed 
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When the jurisdictional test of the threshold criteria was introduced it was 
done to include transactions that had a significant cross-border impact, yet 
would not have satisfied the previous turnover thresholds. This was done to 
eliminate the need for multiple national filings.62 These thresholds only relate 
to the economic size of the parties and do not depend on the substantive 
impact of the transaction, or on whether the merger will have any effects 
within the EU. This means that the EUMR is not limited to mergers that take 
place in the EU and that it can apply regardless of the nationalities of the 
parties.63  
Originally, introduced in 1989, the test was whether the merger in question 
fell under the three cumulative criteria:  
(a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the 
undertakings concerned is more than EUR 5 000 million; 
and 
(b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at 
least two of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 
250 million,  
(c) unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves 
more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide 
turnover within one and the same Member State. 
When the EU Merger Regulation was then reviewed again with the 
Commissions 1996 Green Paper there was broad support for the “one stop 
shop” principle to be extended to mergers that would otherwise be subject to 
merger control by three or more NCAs in the EU.64 These additional tests 
mean that mergers that do not meet the original threshold requirements still 
have an “Community Dimension” if they meet the following tests:  
(i) lower worldwide threshold: the aggregate worldwide 
turnover of all the undertakings concerned exceeds €2,500 
million; and 
                                                 
time. It was accepted by the parties that there was an Community dimension at the time of 
the concentration and on the date of the notification made at the Commission’s request. It 
was therefore found irrelevant that the concentration didn’t meet the thresholds during the 
investigation and that fact did not deprive the Commission of jurisdiction in this merger, 
see para 44. This is understandable as one could imagine the jurisdiction of the Commission 
being very limited if the parties concerned could limit their turnover during the 
investigation to escape the Commissions jurisdiction.  
62 Ioannis Kokkoris. Howard Shelanski. EU Merger Control: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis (OPU 2014), p. 31. 
63 Bellamy and Child. European Union Law of Competition (7th edition), p. 547 
64 Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy. COM (96) 721 final, para 
192. 
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(ii) lower EU-wide threshold: the aggregate EU-wide 
turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings 
concerned exceeds €100 million; and 
(iii) additional three Member States thresholds: in each of 
at least three Member States:  
– the combined aggregate turnover of all the undertakings 
concerned is more than €100 million; and 
– each of at least two of the undertakings concerned 
achieves a turnover of more than €25 million (in each of 
the same three Member States identified); and 
(iv) two-thirds rule: a concentration does not have an EU 
dimension if each of the undertakings concerned achieves 
more than two-thirds of its aggregate EU-wide turnover 
within one and the same Member State65 
In 2000 and 2009 the Commission reported to the Council on the operation 
of these thresholds.66 In the report from 2000, the Commission concluded that 
a number of transactions that have significant cross-border effects don’t fall 
under the EUMR.67 In the Green paper from 2001, the Commission raised the 
issue of multiple filings. This issue was one of the reasons for the changes 
that were made on Article 1(3) but, as was noted by the Commission, it fell 
short of its objectives. Despite further cooperation between NCAs inter alia 
it was suggested that it would still not be an equivalent substitute for the ‘one-
stop-shop’ control of mergers with a cross-border effects. The Commission 
deliberated some possible modifications to the Article but found that it would 
most likely not solve the problem.68 In 2009 the Commission reported to the 
Council that, overall, the thresholds generally operated in a satisfactory way. 
Despite this it was also noted that number of transactions still had to be 
notified in three or more member states.69 
The Commission has explained that the thresholds are designed to govern 
jurisdiction and neither assess the market position of the parties to the 
concentration nor the impact of the operation. The thresholds are not limited 
to any specific part of the operations but include all turnover of the parties 
involved in the merger. The fact that they are only based on turnover 
                                                 
65 Reg. 139/2004 [2004] OJ L24/1 
66 See the older EUMR.  
67 Report to the Council on the application of the Merger Regulation Thresholds, 
COM(2000) 399 final.  
68 Green paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 COM(2001) 745/6 
Final, paras. 24-33. 
69 Commission report to Council on the functioning of Regulation 139/2004 COM(2009) 
281 final.  
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calculation also means that they are purely quantitative. They are supposed to 
provide a simple and objective mechanism that can easily be handled by the 
companies involved in a merger so they can determine if their transaction 
needs to be notified or not.70  
2.2.2 Turnover calculations 
When determining jurisdiction, the undertakings concerned are the ones that 
participate in a concentration, or an acquisition of control as is mentioned in 
Article 3(1). When there is a merger then the undertakings concerned are the 
merging undertakings. Whereas if there is an acquisition it is the concept of 
‘acquiring control’ that determines which are the undertakings concerned.71  
When deciding whether the thresholds in Article 1 are met, both the 
individual and aggregate turnover of the relevant undertakings will be 
decisive in determining whether the thresholds are met.72  
Once the undertakings concerned have been identified, their turnover for the 
purposes of determining jurisdiction is to be calculated per the rules set out 
in Article 5.73 Article 5(1) defines the turnover as ‘the amount derived by the 
undertakings concerned in the previous financial year from the sale of 
products and provision of services falling with the undertakings ordinary 
activities’.74 
Article 5(4) of the EUMR provides the following:  
Without prejudice to paragraph 2, the aggregate turnover 
of an undertaking concerned within the meaning of this 
Regulation shall be calculated by adding together the 
respective turnovers of the following: 
(a) the undertaking concerned;  
(b) those undertakings in which the undertaking concerned, 
directly or indirectly: 
(i) owns more than half the capital or business assets, or 
(ii) has the power to exercise more than half the voting 
rights, or  
                                                 
70 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01) published 
16.4.2008, para. 127. 
71 ibid, paras. 132-133.  
72 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01) published 
16.4.2008, para 129. 
73 ibid, para. 130.  
74 ibid, paras. 154-157.  
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(iii) has the power to appoint more than half the members 
of the supervisory board, the administrative board or 
bodies legally representing the undertakings, or 
(iv) has the right to manage the undertakings' affairs; 
(c) those undertakings which have in the undertaking 
concerned the rights or powers listed in (b);  
(d) those undertakings in which an undertaking as referred 
to in (c) has the rights or powers listed in (b); 
(e) those undertakings in which two or more undertakings 
as referred to in (a) to (d) jointly have the rights or powers 
listed in (b). 
Article 5(4) sets out comprehensive criteria to identify undertakings whose 
turnover may be attributed to the undertaking concerned because of certain 
direct or indirect links with the latter. The Article provides that turnover is 
calculated by reference not only to the undertakings concerned but also to the 
turnover of all those entities which they control or by which they are 
controlled, and to other connected undertakings.75 This is done to capture the 
total volume of the economic resources that are being combined through the 
operation without regard to whether the economic activities are performed 
directly by the undertaking concerned, whether they are undertaken or 
indirectly by companies and undertakings that are linked to the undertaking 
concerned as is described in Article 5(4).76  
The concept of ‘a group’ is not defined by an abstract definition in the EUMR 
but certain rights and powers are set out in Article 5(4)(b) that, if 
undertakings, directly or indirectly, concerned possess, mean that they are 
part of a group for purposes of turnover calculations according to the 
EUMR.7778 
In the Commission’s Case IAG/BMI COMP/M.6447 the Commission 
reviewed a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of the EUMR where 
the undertaking International Consolidated Airlines Group (“IAG”) directly 
or via a subsidiary British Airways Plc. (“BA”) planned to acquire, within the 
                                                 
75 Alison Jones, Brenda Sufrin. EU Competition Law. Text, Cases and Materials (5th 
Edition OPU 2014), p. 1149. 
76 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01) published 
16.4.2008, para. 175. 
77 ibid, paras. 175-177. 
78 It is important to note that the definition of control that is found in Article 5(4) is 
different and more narrowly defined than in Article 3(2). This was done with the aim to 
provide more legal certainty and it has been suggested that harmonization might be needed 
although no harmonization of the rules has been made to that effect. See Green Paper on the 
Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, COM/2001/0745 final. 
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meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the EUMR, sole control of the whole of the 
undertaking British Midlands Limited ("bmi”) by way of purchase of shares.  
IAG was the holding company of both BA and Iberia Líneas Aéreas de 
España, S.A. Bmi was owned by Deutsche Lufthansa AG (“LH”) through its 
subsidiary, LHBD Holding Limited (“LHBD”), at the time of the proposed 
concentration.  
In determining the jurisdiction of the case, the Commission used the 
definition found in the Jurisdictional notice from 200879 on the undertakings 
concerned. So in this case the undertakings concerned were the ones 
participating in a concentration. As this was an acquisition of sole control of 
an undertaking, the undertakings concerned were the acquiring undertaking 
and the target undertaking. The Commission found that on the target side the 
‘undertakings concerned’ were bmi and on the acquirer’s side either IAG or 
BA, dependent on which one would acquire bmi.80  
When calculating the turnover on the acquiring side, the Commission found 
that under Article 5(4)(b)(i) the turnover of BA had to be added to the 
turnover of IAG. This was reasoned with the fact that IAG held far more than 
half the aggregate nominal value of the shares, and so fulfilled the criterion 
of Article 5(4)(b)(i).81  
It was also found that the turnover of the Iberian operating company Iberia 
Líneas Aéréas de España, Sociedad Anónima Operadora (“IB Opco”), should 
be added to that of IAG under Article 5(4)(b)(iii) and, in subsequent order, 
also under Article 5(4)(b)(iv). IAG had the power to appoint more than half 
the members of IB Opco’s board of directors. The fact that the majority of 
directors had to be Spanish nationals and that one of the directors, that IAG 
was entitled to appoint, must be the CEO of BA did not affect this. IAG had 
in practice chosen the BA CEO.82 IAG also had the right to manage IB Opco’s 
affairs, e.g. development of strategy for the group, the annual budgets or 
financial plans for IB Opco (including capital, revenue and manpower), and 
so fell under Article 5(4)(b)(iv).83 IAG was also found to have de facto the 
power to exercise more than half of the voting rights in the shareholder’s 
assembly even though the Spanish National Entity (‘SNE’) had 50,1% of the 
shares and voting rights in IB Opco Holdings. This was because SNE could 
only vote contrary to IAG’s instructions in a limited number of cases and even 
if SNE would vote contrary to the instructions of IAG the final word would 
                                                 
79 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01) published 
16.4.2008. 
80 IAG/ BMI (C(2016) 3893) COMP/M.6447 [2012], paras 2-6  
81 ibid, paras 10-11.  
82 ibid, paras 13-16. See also footnote 7 and 8 in the same authority. 
83 ibid, paras 17-21. 
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still be with IAG through the decision of its shareholders’ meeting. For this 
reason, the Commission found that this fell under Article 5(4)(b)(ii).84  
The Commission found that if BA was the ‘undertaking concerned’ then the 
turnover of Iberia should be added to that of BA under Article 5(4)(d) of the 
EUMR, given that IAG owned more than half of the capital of BA and 
enjoyed one or more of the powers and rights of Article 5(4)(b) of the EUMR 
in Iberia, as was discussed earlier.  
This meant that, regardless of whether IAG or BA would be the final buyer 
such links were found to exist between IAG, BA and Iberia, that their 
turnovers must be added together for the purposes of determining jurisdiction 
under the EUMR. As the parties did not achieve more than two thirds of their 
respective turnover within one and the same Member State, the proposed 
transaction was found to have a Community Dimension pursuant to Article 
1(2) of the EUMR.  
After defining the relevant market of the transaction, the Commission decided 
not to oppose the transactions as it was modified by the Commitments and to 
declare it compatible with the Internal market and with the functioning of the 
EEA agreement.85  
This case shows the extent of power needed to for an undertaking to be 
considered to fall under Article 5(4) and how that can greatly impact the 
turnover calculations and, in return, whether a case falls under the jurisdiction 
of the EUMR. If e.g. the undertaking concerned is a joint venture, for example 
where the joint venture takes over another undertaking, the question then 
arises whether the joint venture partners’ turnovers should be added to the 
turnover of the joint venture.86  
2.2.2.1 The related undertakings  
Article 5(4)(b) only defines when an undertaking must be counted as a 
subsidiary. To be able to determine the limits of the group of an undertaking 
concerned it would normally be necessary to decide also on the inclusion of 
e.g. parent undertakings and sister-undertakings. Article 5(4) and (5) give 
instructions on this.  
Subsidiaries of an undertaking concerned must be included in the group 
according to Article 5(4)(b). As the Article also refers to ‘undertakings’ in 
plural, it covers all situations where one undertaking concerned has more than 
one direct subsidiary. According to Article 5(4)(c), the group of an 
undertaking also covers ‘those undertakings which have in the undertaking 
                                                 
84 It being noted that IB Opco Holding holds all the shares in IB Opco so that these two 
companies are linked in the meaning of Article 5(4)(b)(i). 
85 IAG/ BMI (C(2016) 3893) COMP/M.6447 [2012], paras. 21-30.  
86 Karsten Engsig. Sorensen, Pernille Jessen, et.al, Regulating Competition in the EU 
(Kluwer Law International 2016), p. 267-268. 
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concerned the rights or powers listed in (b)’. So, a parent to an undertaking 
concerned must be included for the purpose of calculating the Community 
Dimension.  
Two questions have been raised concerning this: can an undertaking have 
more than one parent, and are both direct and indirect parent undertakings 
included in the group of the undertaking concerned.87 The first question seems 
quite straight forward. The Article applies the plural ‘undertakings’ which 
indicates that the drafters of the EUMR foresaw situations where an 
undertaking is controlled by more than one undertaking concerned within the 
meaning of Article 5(4)(b). The second question leaves more room for debate. 
The wording of Article 5(4)(c)88 does not contain the words ‘directly or 
indirectly’. This could be interpreted to mean that only the direct parent 
undertakings may be included. This interpretation is flawed because it would 
not give a clear measurement of the financial strength of the group of the 
undertaking concerned and it would mean that very similar transactions made 
by the same business would be treated very differently. That could make 
forum shopping very easy.89 
The Commission seems to have taken the same view and does this by relying 
on the fact that the word ‘undertakings’ is in the plural in Article 5(4)(c). 
Arguing that, by using the plural the drafters intended to cover both direct and 
indirect parent undertakings. This could have been clearer if the words 
‘indirect or direct’ were included in the text.90 Sister-undertakings must also 
be included when calculating the Community Dimension, per Article 5(4)(d), 
the same line of argument follows here that because of the plural of 
‘undertakings’ both direct and indirect sister-undertakings fall within the 
group.91 
The Commission has explained that where two or more undertakings jointly 
control the undertaking concerned, in the sense that an agreement between 
them is needed to manage the undertakings affairs, the turnover of all of them 
                                                 
87 Morten P. Broberg Broberg on the European Commission's Jurisdiction to Scrutinise 
Mergers (Fourth Edition European Monographs Series Volume 16 Kluwer Law 
International 2013) pp. 101-105. 
88 At least in the English version. The author of this thesis does not have the language skills 
to investigate all language versions to see whether this applies to all of them.  
89 Morten P. Broberg Broberg on the European Commission's Jurisdiction to Scrutinise 
Mergers (Fourth Edition European Monographs Series Volume 16 Kluwer Law 
International 2013), p. 105-106. See Morten P. Brobergs examples for further explanation 
of the problem.  
90 Interestingly enough this was the case in the Danish version of the former Merger 
Regulation.  
91 Morten P. Broberg Broberg on the European Commission’s Jurisdiction to Scrutinise 
Mergers (Fourth Edition European Monographs Series Volume 16 Kluwer Law 
International 2013), p. 106-107.  
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should be included in the turnover calculations.92 This can result in small joint 
ventures exceeding the turnover threshold, provided that the joint venture 
partners have a sufficiently large turnover threshold.  
Article 5(4)(e) is supposed to deal with joint ventures that are set up by several 
undertakings in the same corporate group. The turnover of such a joint venture 
should also be included in the turnover of the participating undertaking. 
Article 5(5) then deals with the situation when a joint venture is jointly 
controlled by the undertakings concerned, e.g. where two undertakings that 
already have a joint venture merge or set up a new joint venture. Finally, 
Article 5(5)(b) explains that the turnover of the undertakings concerned is 
allocated in proportion to their participation.93 
Reading Article 5 of the EUMR one might assume that every stone has been 
turned and all questions have been answered with regards to the turnover 
calculations. This is however not so, one does not have to dig deep to see that 
there are some aspects that are not as clear as they might be.  
This is for example a problem regarding publicly owned undertakings. Article 
106 TFEU provides a non-discrimination principle between public and 
private businesses. The EUMR is no exception to this principle and 
concentrations involving public undertakings may be notifiable under the 
EUMR in the same way that concentrations involving private undertakings 
are.94 The drafters of the EUMR seem to have recognised this issue when it 
comes to calculating turnover. In recital 22 of the EUMR it is established that 
in the public-sector calculation of the turnover needs to take account of 
undertakings making up an economic unit with independent power of 
decision, irrespective of the way in which the capital is held or of the rules of 
administrative supervision applicable to them.  
This is a derogation from the system provided for in Article 5(4) and (5). Here 
it seems that ‘an economic unit with an independent power of decision’ is 
referencing actual control instead of Article 5(4)(b)’s formal notion of 
control. This would be closer to the definition of control found in Article 
3(2).95 It is not clear from the Commissions case law how the Commission 
applies this to turnover calculations of publicly owned bodies.  
For example, in the Commissions Case IV/M616 Swissair/Sabena, the 
Commission states that ‘there is no need in the present case to calculate the 
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turnover of the Belgian State, even though it is an undertaking concerned 
within the meaning of Article 1 of the Merger Regulation’.96 While in the 
Commission’s Case IV/M157 Air France/Sabena, the Commission seems to 
have considered Sabena alone to constitute the full group for the purposes of 
turnover calculations. The reason for this is not clear but could be in-line with 
the Commission’s explanations in the Jurisdictional notice from 2008 where, 
in paragraph 193, it is stated that ‘Member States (or other public bodies) are 
not considered as ‘undertakings’ under Article 5(4) simply because they have 
interests in other undertakings which satisfy the conditions of Article 5(4). 
Therefore, for the purposes of calculating turnover of State-owned 
undertakings, account is only taken of those undertakings which belong to the 
same economic unit, having the same independent power of decision’. 
Accordingly, State-owned companies, that are not subject to any coordination 
with other State-controlled holdings, should be treated as independent for the 
purposes of Article 5 and the turnover of other state owned undertakings 
should not be taken into account.97 In practise a state owned undertaking that 
has been placed on the stock exchange has been considered to be a single 
economic entity. This seems to show that the level at which strategy, business 
plan and budget are decided is deceive in this regard. 
2.2.2.2 The two thirds threshold and the undertakings 
concerned  
The two thirds threshold can be found in the second paragraph of Article 
1(3)(d). It provides that where all the undertakings concerned, in the merger 
or acquisition, generate more than two thirds of their Union-wide turnover in 
one and the same Member State, the merger does not have a Community 
Dimension. The Commission’s Jurisdictional Notice from 200898 does not 
explain whether this threshold must be viewed individually, so that it applies 
to all undertakings concerned, or whether it is linked to the thresholds 
requiring at least two of the undertakings to generate EUR 250 million, 
respectively EUR 100 million in the Union. If the latter case were chosen it 
would then mean that, the two-thirds threshold would only apply to those 
undertakings which meet the Union-wide turnover thresholds.99  
                                                 
96 This decision was made before the commissions Jurisdictional Notice from 2008.  
97 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01) published 
16.4.2008, para. 194. 
98 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01) published 
16.4.2008. 
99 Morten P. Broberg Broberg on the European Commission's Jurisdiction to Scrutinise 
Mergers (Fourth Edition European Monographs Series Volume 16 Kluwer Law 
International 2013), pp. 24-25.  
  30 
Both readings could be argued but the decision in the Commission’s Case 
IV/M883 Prudential/HSBC/Finnish Chemicals100, seems to give an answer to 
this question. There Prudential and HSBC jointly acquired Finnish 
Chemicals. The acquiring undertakings were both situated in the United 
Kingdom and both of them generated over EUR 250 million in the union but 
more than two-thirds of their Union-wide turnover was within the United 
Kingdom alone. Finnish Chemicals, however, did not generate more than 
two-thirds of its Union-wide turnover in the United Kingdom. The 
Commission found that the transaction had Community Dimension, the two-
thirds rule must have been applied to all the undertakings concerned 
regardless of whether they generated more than EUR 250 million in the 
Union.101  
This seems like a logical conclusion with regards to the wording of Article 
1(2) and (3) where thresholds are defined in positive terms together with the 
‘two-thirds threshold’ that is defined in negative terms. It would seem 
inconsistent to include all undertakings concerned when calculating the 
worldwide turnover thresholds and the Union-wide thresholds but then 
exclude some of these when calculating the two thirds thresholds. That would 
mean that two different interpretations would be applied to the term 
‘undertaking concerned’ that is included in all the thresholds without any 
notion of doing so from the drafters of the EUMR.  
2.2.3 Current discussion on the threshold 
system  
In the Commissions White Paper from 2014 it is suggested that the case 
referral system could be enhanced to better serve the purpose of departing 
form the results of the turnover tests when necessary.102 Here it seems that the 
Commission is suggesting that there are mergers, where the turnover tests are 
not an adequate measure to see whether or not a merger, should fall under the 
Commissions jurisdiction.  
On the 7th of October 2016 the European Commission launched a public 
consultation on the functioning of certain procedural and jurisdictional 
aspects of EU merger control. One of the main aspects of this was the 
effectiveness of the purely turnover-based notification thresholds of the 
EUMR.103  
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In the questionnaire for public consultation that the Commission released at 
the same time, this effectiveness is discussed. There it is explained how a 
debate had arisen whether the current threshold system allows for capturing 
all transactions which can potentially have an impact on the Internal 
market.104 This falls in line with Commissioner Vestager’s comments in her 
speech on the 10th of March. There she explained how Facebook’s purchase 
of WhatsApp in 2014, a company with 600 million users and a purchase price 
of 19 billion, didn’t meet the merger thresholds of the EUMR.105 
According to Commissioner Vestager’s speech and the Commission’s 
questionnaire this is especially clear in some industries, namely the digital 
and pharmaceutical industries. This could be where the acquired company, 
while having generated little turnover, may play a competitive role, hold 
commercially valuable data or have considerable market potential for some 
other reasons. In the digital economy, this is quite common. Often services 
are launched to build up a significant user base before significant revenues 
are made. Because of the large number of users, however, these services may 
play a competitive role. This could e.g. be because the relevant business 
model involves collecting and analysing large inventories of data that has the 
potential of generating significant turnover. Acquisitions of companies like 
this might not be captured under the current turnover-based thresholds. They 
would therefore not have a Community Dimension even though the 
acquisition could have a significant impact on the Community market.106 
It has therefore been suggested that additional notification requirements based 
on alternative criteria, such as transaction value, should be added to the 
EUMR to complement the existing turnover-based jurisdictional 
thresholds.107  
At first glance these suggestions seem to be reasonable but, when read in 
conjunction with the EUMR, questions rise on the real need for these 
complementing requirements, especially with regards to the referral and 
allocations of cases where mergers do not have Community Dimension.108  
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One case in particular has been used as an example of a case that could have 
fallen outside of the Commission’s jurisdiction. That is the Commission’s 
Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp. 
In August 2014, the European Commission received notification of a 
proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of EUMR, and, following a 
referral pursuant to Article 4(5) of the EUMR, by which Facebook, Inc. 
(“Facebook”, USA) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the 
EUMR control of the whole of WhatsApp Inc. (‘Whatsapp’, USA) by way of 
purchase of shares.109  
The parties of this merger, Facebook and Whatsapp, were both providers of 
consumer communications services. The proposed concentration consisted of 
the acquisition of WhatsApp by Facebook for a purchase price of USD 19 
billion.110  
This merger was interesting in many ways and is still being debated.111 Due 
to constraints in length this thesis will focus only on the Community 
Dimension of the merger. The transaction did not have a Community 
Dimension within the meaning of Article 1(2) or Article 1(3) of the EUMR 
as the EU turnover of WhatsApp didn’t amount to the thresholds needed. 
Regardless of this, the transaction fulfilled the two conditions set out in 
Article 4(5) of the EUMR since it was a concentration within the meaning of 
Article 3 of the EUMR and was capable of being reviewed under the national 
competition laws of three Member States.  
Facebook therefore informed the Commission on the 19th of May 2014 by 
means of a reasoned submission that the transaction should be examined by 
the Commission pursuant to Article 4(5) of the EUMR. A copy of that 
submission was transmitted to the Member States on the 19th of May 2014 
but none of the Member States that were competent to review the Transaction 
expressed disagreement as with it being referred to the Commission. The 
merger was then accordingly deemed to have a Community Dimension 
pursuant to Article 4(5) of the EUMR.  
This means that even though the acquisition price for WhatsApp was 19 
billion USD, the turnover of WhatsApp was still so low as not to require 
notification to the Commission based on the turnover thresholds in Article 1. 
Facebook opted for the “One stop shop” option of Article 4(5) and informed 
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the Commission with a reasoned submission that the concentration should be 
examined by the Commission.  
The Commission agreed with Facebook with regards to the relevant 
geographic market for the transaction and found it to be at least EEA wide, if 
not worldwide.112   
Even though Whatsapp’s turnover wasn’t high enough for it to fall under the 
Community Dimension, discussed in Article 1 of the EUMR, it still held a 
large percentage of the relevant market, or 20-30% per the Commission’s 
assessment.113 The Commission also notes that it believes that this is an 
underestimation because the data used was collected by an app that is owned 
by Facebook but there was no other good data that could be used instead.114 
Despite this, the Commission found, based on further analysis and market 
investigations, that the transaction did not give rise to serious doubts as to its 
compatibility with the Internal market.115116 
This case is a good example of a merger which did not have to fall under the 
Commission’s jurisdiction according to the EUMR. In Commissioner 
Vestager’s speech it’s clear that mergers, such as this one, are the ones that 
the Commission expects might not be covered under the current EUMR. Here 
we find two companies which have very different turnovers, but both have 
considerable market power. The high purchase price of WhatsApp also 
indicates that the turnover of the undertaking might not have been the reason 
for the acquisition.  
What is interesting to review is that even though there was a possibility of 
this merger falling outside the EUMR jurisdiction it didn’t. Here there was a 
possibility to apply Article 4(5) of the EUMR and, in line with the idea behind 
the ‘One-Stop-Shop’ principle, it was applied.117 This is not surprising 
considering the convenience of only needing to go through one investigation 
instead of several which would otherwise have been the case. Especially 
considering the market of the proposed merger is such that it was unlikely 
that the Commission would refer according to Article 9. This then raises the 
question of whether there is need to change the current threshold regulations. 
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3 Exclusive Competence of 
the Commission under the 
EUMR and Referral of Cases  
The Commission has, as has been explained, competence over merger cases 
which have a Community Dimension. Not only does it have jurisdiction, but 
according to Article 21(1) of the EUMR, it has exclusive jurisdiction over 
them. What Article 21 also indicates is that mergers that do not have 
Community Dimension are not under EU law.118  
There are also provisions in the EUMR that provide for circumstances where 
a merger that has a Community Dimension can be referred to a NCA. Article 
4(4) allows the Commission to refer a case to the relevant NCA. This is 
possible where the Commission considers that a concentration may 
significantly affect competition in a market within a Member State which 
presents all the characteristics of a distinct market. Article 9 also allows for 
the Commission to refer a case to the relevant NCAs if a concentration 
threatens to significantly affect competition in a market within that Member 
State, which presents all the characteristics of a distinct market, or a 
concentration affects competition in a market within that Member State, 
which presents all the characteristics of a distinct market and which does not 
constitute a substantial part of the common market.  
The EUMR also provides provisions where mergers without a Community 
Dimension can be referred to the Commission. These are Article 4(5), and 
Article 22. Article 4(5) allows the parties involved in the concentration to 
notify the Commission without notifying the NCA if the merger would fall 
under the jurisdiction of at least three Member States. Article 22 then allows 
the NCAs to refer mergers to the Commission if the concentration affects 
trade between Member States and threatens to significantly affect competition 
within the territory of the Member State or States making the request.  
Originally Merger Regulation no. 4069/89 was foreseen by the Council and 
the Commission so that referrals would only be resorted to in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ where ‘the interests in respect of competition of the Member 
State concerned could not be adequately protected in any other way’.119 As 
competition law developed in the Member States so did the circumstances 
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that Merger Regulation no. 4096/89 was applied to and changes needed to be 
made. Almost all the Member States had introduced Merger Control laws and 
referrals, both from the Commission to the Member states and vice versa, 
were made where ‘exceptional circumstances’ were debatable. The number 
of transactions where the thresholds of Article 1 were not met but still had to 
be notified in several Member State Jurisdictions also grew.120 
Because of this, revisions have been made in the current EUMR. They were 
designed to facilitate the re-attribution of cases between the Commission and 
Member States consistent with the principle of subsidiarity while still 
preserving the basic features of the older regulation especially the ‘One Stop 
Shop’ provision.121 
3.1 Article 4(4) and (5) Referrals  
Article 4(4) allows notifying parties to make a reasoned submission that a 
merger with a Community Dimension may significantly affect competition in 
a distinct market in a Member State and should be examined, in whole or in 
part, by that Member State.122 This Article is an important option for notifying 
parties but, by reasons of this thesis being limited to questions regarding the 
broadening of the Commission’s Jurisdiction, there will not be further 
discussion on the application of this Article.  
Article 4(5), on the other hand, allows merging parties to refer straight to the 
Commission, even though there isn’t a Community Dimension, if the 
requirements of the Article are met. Those requirements are only two: the 
transaction must be a concentration within the meaning of Article 3 of EUMR 
and it must be possible that the merger falls under the jurisdiction of three 
Member State NCAs.123  
In the recitals for the current EUMR it was explained that requests for pre-
notification referrals to the Commission would be especially relevant when a 
merger would affect competition beyond the territory of one Member State.124 
This would make mergers, where the merger participants are not very 
dependent on the physical location of their services, likely to fall under the 
criteria granted that the other tests of the Article would be fulfilled. This could 
also be where markets are wider than national markets. In such cases it is 
likely that competitive dynamics extend over territories, beyond national 
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boundaries. It could therefore be argued that, because investigations might 
need to be made in several countries with appropriate enforcement powers, it 
is likely that the Commission would be in the best position to accomplish such 
an investigation.125  
The merging parties could also submit that it would be more efficient, both 
with regards to time and economically, to be able to submit only to the 
Commission instead of having the merger investigated by multiple NCAs.126 
One famous case that was referred to the Commission with application of 
Article 4(5) of the EUMR is Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp which was 
discussed in an earlier chapter.  
Another interesting case is the Commission’s case NOKIA/NAVTEQ. There 
Nokia, a provider of equipment, solutions and services for electronic 
communication networks, planned to acquire, within the meaning of Article 
3(1)(b) of the EUMR, the whole of the undertaking NAVTEQ a supplier of 
navigable digital map databases.  
The parties to the proposed concentration met neither of the turnover 
thresholds set out in Article 1(2) and (3). This meant that the concentration 
did not have a Community dimension within the meaning of Article 1. 
Because the transaction could have been reviewed under the national merger 
control law of eleven Member States, Nokia opted to request a referral to the 
Commission pursuant to Article 4(5) of the EUMR. As no Member State 
objected to this the proposed concentration was deemed to have a Community 
dimension.127  
The Commission found that this concentration was of a purely vertical nature 
where a producer of a good acquires its main provider of an important input. 
The Commission’s analysis was in line with its Guidelines on the assessment 
of non-horizontal mergers and the Commission’s previous decision 
concerning the merger between TomTom and Tele Atlas,128 which were the 
other supplier of navigable digital map databases. After an in-depth economic 
analysis, the Commission concluded that the merged company would be 
unlikely to close off competitors and concluded that the proposed 
concentration would not raise any competition concerns.  
Even though this merger was smaller in scale than the Facebook/Whatsapp 
merger, discussed earlier, in many ways it depicts a similar situation. The 
merger is between two companies in the digital industries who opted for the 
‘One Stop Shop’ option of the EUMR. The same had in fact been done by 
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their competition not long before.129 Another case, regarding undertakings in 
the digital industries, was the Commission’s case IBM / TELELOGIC. In this 
case IBM, a U.S. company, active worldwide in the development, production 
and marketing of IT products, software and services, planned to acquire sole 
control the Swedish company Telelogic which was active in the development 
and sale of software development tools. This concentration within the 
meaning of Article 3(1)(b) did not meet the turnover thresholds set out in 
Article 1(2) and 1(3) of the EUMR. As was the case in the previously 
mentioned mergers, there was a referral case made pursuant to Article 4(5) 
because it would have had to notify the concentration to several NCAs 
otherwise.130 131 
The cases discussed are not nearly the only cases where Article 4(5) has been 
applied. In fact, there have been 315 Article 4(5) referral requests accepted 
and only 7 requests refused, making this type of referral the most commonly 
used one since the year 2004.132 Based on this information, one could imagine 
that the benefits that an undertaking can gain from the ‘One Stop Shop’ 
advantages, where Article 4(5) is applicable, could be substantial, making it 
less likely that an undertaking would try to circumvent the EUMR 
jurisdiction.  
3.2 Article 9 Referral  
Article 21(3) paragraph 2 allows Member States to carry out all enquires 
necessary to be able to apply Article 4(4), 9(2) or after referral, pursuant to 
Article 9(3) first subparagraph, indent (b), or Article 9(5), to take the 
measures strictly necessary for the application of Article 9(8).  
Article 9 is commonly referred to as the ‘German clause’, as it was initially 
introduced by the Germans who at the beginning were opposed to the 
introduction of EU merger control, fearing that the Commission’s 
investigations might not be as vigorous as the national merger control.133 
They were also afraid that national control would be lost and local and 
regional issues might not be sufficiently addressed.134 Article 9 provides for 
the referral, at the request of a national authority, of a merger or aspects of it, 
to that authority where the concentration threatens competitions.  
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Article 9 has been recognised to have the objective, within the principle of 
‘One Stop Shop’ and legal certainty, to secure the principle of subsidiarity so 
a NCA should manage a case when it is in the best position to do so.135 It now 
works as an important corrective mechanism for reallocating appropriate 
cases to NCAs, for example where cases raise distinct queries regarding a 
Member State, or regional or local markets.136  
Despite this role the article concedes little authority to the Member States. 
The Commission, after having received a request from a Member State, in 
accordance with Article 9(2)(a) or (b), determines whether the requesting 
State has prima facie demonstrated that a distinct market exists, and that the 
concentration threatens to significantly affect competition within that 
Member State. Even if these conditions are satisfied, the Commission still has 
discretion, provided for in Article 9(3), to deal with the case itself or to make 
a total or partial reference of the case to the competent national authority. It 
is only in Article 9(2)(b) cases where the Member State has provided 
preliminary evidence establishing that the concentration affects competition 
in markets with a narrow geographic scope.137 This is counteracted by the 
recitals of the EUMR. There it is made clear that there should be co-operation 
between the NCAs and the Commission with the view that multiple 
notifications of a given concentration are avoided to the greatest extent 
possible.138 The reality is that most cases are referred partially or fully 
following an Article 9 request.139 
Article 9 now operates as an important corrective mechanism for reallocating 
appropriate cases or aspects of them to NCA’s. In the Commission’s case 
M.5996 Thomas Cook/CGL and Midland the issue arose concerning specific 
elements in a Member State. Here the NCA of the UK (Office of Fair Trading 
(“OFT”)) requested a referral based on Article 9(2)(a) and 9(2)(b) for a 
merger of three travel businesses, constituting a single concentration within 
the meaning of Article 3(1)(b). At least two of the undertakings concerned 
had an EU-wide turnover in excess of EUR 250 million and the two-thirds 
turnover threshold did not apply so there was a Community dimension 
pursuant to Article 1(2) of the EUMR.  
When assessing whether the two conditions for a referral on the basis of 
Article 9(2)(a) were met the Commission found that there was real risk that 
the proposed transaction could have significant adverse impact on 
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competition in the market. The Commission also found that because of the 
nature of the market in question the merger would lead to a high combined 
market share of the parties, both at the national level and even more at the 
regional level. Correspondingly, the Commission found that the conditions 
for referral under Article 9(2)(a) of the EUMR were met. Even so, the 
Commission had discretion whether to refer the case to the competent 
authorities of the United Kingdom. Based on the fact that the merger would 
not have any impact on competition in other Member States, the OFT’s 
thorough knowledge of the UK market and because the OFT had recently 
dealt with one case in the same industry, it was concluded that OFT was better 
suited to carry out a thorough investigation of the whole case.  
The referral option of Article 9(2)(a) is a delicate one. The Commission has 
to make sure that it doesn’t undermine the ‘One Stop Shop’ principle and the 
General Court has made it clear that these references should only be made in 
exceptional circumstances.140  
In the Commission’s case Exxon/Mobil the United Kingdom notified the 
Commission in accordance with Article 9(2)(b) of the EUMR that it 
considered that the concentration affected competition in northwest of 
Scotland in the retail motor fuel sector. The Commission found, however that 
this concentration concerned competition in the market for motor fuel 
retailing in the whole of the UK. The Commission could therefore not refer 
the case in accordance with Article 9(2)(b) of the EUMR.141 The Commission 
does not spend many words on explaining how it finds this market but 
considering the wording of Article 9(2)(b)142 the narrow scope of the Article 
explains it in a way. Although, as has been mentioned, the Commission has a 
wide margin digression. 
With all of this in mind it is interesting to go back to the beginning. The 
purpose of this Article was to try to secure the interests of Member States 
where the concentration threatens competition in a ‘distinct’ market in the 
requesting NCA’s state.143 Here the Commission shares its exclusive 
competences with the appropriate NCAs which conforms to the ideas behind 
the EUs subsidiarity principle defined in Article 5 of the Treaty on European 
Union, giving a Member State more opportunity to deal with a merger at a 
central, regional, or local level.144 Even so the General Court has defined the 
                                                 
140 Case T-119/02, Royal Philips Electronics v Commission [2003] ECR II-1433, para 354 
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cases where this is possible narrowly145 and, with regards to the possible 
implications of mergers with a Community dimension, that is understandable. 
Nevertheless, this is worth inspecting with regards to the suggestion of 
widening the jurisdiction of the EUMR. If Article 9 is a type of ‘safety net’ 
to secure that national and regional merger issues are sufficiently addressed, 
then widening of the jurisdiction, combined with the limited possibilities of 
referrals under the Article, could mean that domestic issues of the Member 
States would fall through the cracks.  
3.3 Article 22 Referral 
Originally, Article 22, or the Dutch rule as it was called, was included to 
enable Member States without merger control rules to refer especially 
complicated mergers, from a competition perspective, to the Commission. 
Three of the four first cases, that were referred with application of this rule, 
were from Member States without merger rules.146 The latest EUMR sought 
to simplify and clarify the Article 22 procedure.147 There were only seven 
referrals with application of Article 22 in the years 1990 until 2004 but 25 
referrals from the year 2005 until 2017 which might suggest that this was, at 
least partly, achieved.148  
The aspired results of the Article 22 procedure is described in the EUMR 
recitals. There it is explained that a Member State should be able to refer to 
the Commission a concentration, which does not have a Community 
Dimension, but which affects trade between Member states and threatens to 
significantly affect competition within its territory.149 With the current EUMR 
NCAs are given the possibility to refer any concentration as defined in Article 
3, of the same regulation, that don’t have a Community Dimension within the 
meaning of Article 1 to the Commission.  
Once a referral has been made, the Commission follows the procedural rules 
of the EUMR as if the merger in question had a Community Dimension. In 
the previous Merger Regulation, the Commission could not examine the 
effects of the merger in the territory of Member States, that did not make or 
join the request, unless the examination of the effects of the merger couldn’t 
be completed without such examination. This has, however, been changed 
with the current EUMR and even though these cases are referred to the 
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Commission by the Member States (or their NCAs), the Member States do 
not have any power over how the Commission conducts its investigation, and 
the Member States can’t apply their national competition rules.150  
The takeover of Sulizer Textil by Proatech was the first merger that was 
jointly referred to the Commission with the application of Article 22 of the 
EUMR.151 This merger was referred to the Commission by seven NCAs. 
Sulizer Textil was the textile machinery division of Swiss company Sulzter 
LTd. that Promatech SpA, another maker of weaving machinery, wanted to 
acquire. The deal did not meet the threshold requirements in Article 1 of the 
EUMR, and so did not have a Community Dimension. The Commission 
found, after a careful examination of the proposed concentration, that the 
operation raised serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common 
market and with the EEA Agreement. The Commission identified serious 
competitive concerns in the market for rapier weaving machines or, 
alternatively, in a further segmented market for negative rapier weaving 
machines, in Western Europe, that is to say, in the EEA Member States and 
Switzerland.152 Consequently, the Commission initiated proceedings in this 
case pursuant to Articles 6(1)(c) and 22(4) of the EUMR and Article 57 of the 
EEA Agreement. The Commission opened phase II proceedings but 
ultimately approved the merger, subject to divergments.  
This case fulfilled the criteria that the Commission now states is necessary 
for a referral to be made. In the Commission’s Notice on Case Referral from 
2005, it is explained that because a referral by way of Article 22 may entail 
additional cost and time delay for the merging parties, they should be limited 
to cases that appear to present a real risk of negative effects on competition 
and trade between Member States, and where these effects would be best 
addressed at the EU level. The Commission has divided the cases that would 
normally be most appropriate for referral to the Commission pursuant to 
Article 22. They are:  
—  Cases which give rise to serious competition concerns 
in a market/s which is/are wider that national in 
geographic scope, or where some of the potentially affected 
markets are wider than national, and where the main 
economic impact of the concentration is connected to such 
markets. 
—  Cases which give rise to serious competition concerns 
in a series of national or narrower than national markets 
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located in a number of countries of the EU, in 
circumstances where coherent treatment (regarding 
possible remedies but also, in appropriate cases, the 
investigative efforts as such) is considered desirable, and 
where the main economic impact of the concentration is 
connected to such markets153  
Even though this limits the cases that can be referred by the NCAs to the 
Commission, Article 22 still offers an important option. If viewed together 
with the recitals to the EUMR154, one could assume that, because of the 
substantial cooperation between the Commission and the NCAs, few cases 
that could have an impact on competition in the Internal market, or in a 
substantial part of it, would not be referred by the NCAs to the Commission.  
                                                 
153 Commission ‘Notice on Case Referral in respect of concentrations’ (2005/C 56/02) 
published 5.3.2005, para. 45.  
154 Regulation 139/2004 [2004] OJ L24, recitals 13-16. 
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4 Conclusions 
The jurisdictional test made with the threshold criteria is only related to the 
economic size of the parties. As could be seen from the Commission’s case 
Facebook/ Whatsapp155 the turnover of a party in a merger is not always a 
clear indication of the size of the merger or the possible impact that it could 
have on the Internal market. This case also clearly shows that turnover is not 
necessarily a clear indication of the possible value of the undertakings that 
are parties to the merger in question.  
In situations like this the undertakings may, even with the limited turnover, 
still play a competitive role on the relevant market, e.g. they might have a 
significant number of users or have significant amount of valuable assets that 
do not fall under calculatable turnover. To cover the perceived legal gap that 
could occur because of instances like these there have suggestions have been 
made that are aimed at complementing the existing turnover-based 
jurisdictional thresholds by addition of further notification requirements that 
would be based on alternative criteria, like transaction value for example.156 
New developments in industries, such as the digital and pharmaceutical 
industries, have in particular shown that these types of mergers are not merely 
possibilities, thought up by forward thinking legal drafters, but practical 
reality. 
Nevertheless, one must question whether these mergers really do fall outside 
the jurisdiction of the EUMR and, if so, whether they would then have such 
an impact on the Common market that they shouldn’t. As has been explained 
above, the jurisdiction of the EUMR is quite extensive. Even when the 
merging parties do not fulfil the turnover requirements the mergers can still 
be referred to the Commission by request. Either by the parties or the NCAs. 
These referral mechanisms can be found in Article 4 and 22 of the EUMR.  
If a merger falls outside the requirements that make referral by way of these 
Articles possible and does not have the turnover required in Article 1 of the 
EUMR, should it then fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission at all?  
This would for example be a merger that would be limited to the possible 
jurisdiction of the NCA of one or two Member States.157 If this merger would 
then also affect trade between Member States and threaten to significantly 
affect competition within the territory of the Member State or States that it is 
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limited to158, then the relevant NCAs would choose not to refer the merger to 
the Commission. This merger would therefore either not meet the turnover 
thresholds of Article 1 or achieve more than two-thirds of its aggregate 
Community wide turnover within one and the same Member State.  
The turnover thresholds have been a debated subject since the original 
EUMR. The Commission’s previous suggestions of lowering those thresholds 
was met with severe opposition from some Member States, including 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom.159 This, as well as Article 9 of the 
EUMR, shows that the Member States have argued the importance of their 
sovereignty with regards to the application of merger rules. The preamble to 
the EUMR also maintains that there should be close cooperation between the 
competent authorities in each case.160 This is complemented with Article 22 
of the EUMR. It has been argued that referral by way of Article 22 will not 
be used often. It was originally a way for Member States to provide sufficient 
merger control, where none existed, at a national level.161 While it is not used 
as often as referral by way of Article 4(5) it has been used several times.162 
This can also be seen in the Commission’s guiding principles on more 
appropriate authorities found in the Jurisdictional Notice from 2008: 
In principle, jurisdiction should only be re-attributed to 
another competition authority in circumstances where the 
latter is the more appropriate for dealing with a merger, 
having regard to the specific characteristics of the case as 
well as the tools and expertise available to the authority. 
Particular regard should be had to the likely locus of any 
impact on competition resulting from the merger. Regard 
may also be had to the implications, in terms of 
administrative effort, of any contemplated referral.  
The case for re-attributing jurisdiction is likely to be more 
compelling where it appears that a particular transaction 
may have a significant impact on competition and thus may 
deserve careful scrutiny.163 
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Based on all of this it seems prudent to argue that the Commission shouldn’t 
have to worry too much about the cases that fall outside its jurisdiction and 
are not referred to them by the appropriate NCAs. If the NCAs and the 
Commission fulfil their role prescribed in the preamble the EUMR164 then the 
relevant mergers should fall under the applicable NACs jurisdiction.  
Now Article 4(5) also gives merging companies the option of referring the 
applicable merger to the Commission. As has been discussed before this 
option has been used several times, or on average almost 25 times a year since 
2004.165 This option seems like a very practical option for merging parties, as 
it not only means that the ‘One Stop Shop’ principle applies, but also gives 
legal certainty for the parties. The parties can trust the well-established case 
law of the commission. Not only that but if the parties choose not to refer then 
the relevant NCAs could still use Article 22 and refer the case to the 
Commission. This could theoretically also mean that even though the 
Commission would then be empowered to proceed as if the referred merger 
had a Community dimension, it is possible that the transaction may be 
examined by NCAs that didn’t join the referral.166 
In the Commission’s White Paper from 2014 it is suggested that, because it 
happens so seldom that a 4(5) referral is vetoed by a NCA, the referral 
procedure should be simplified. The simplified procedure would mean that 
instead of having the risk of needing to make multiple notifications to NCAs 
after having already made a reasoned submission if a Member State objects, 
the parties would notify directly to the Commission that would then have 
jurisdiction unless a Member state which would be prima facie competent to 
review it opposed it.167168 
This seems like a reasonable suggestion and, because simplifying this 
procedure would make it more likely for merging parties to refer cases to the 
Commission, it would in reality broaden the Commission’s jurisdiction while 
still giving Member States a chance to oppose each case.  
The current determination of jurisdiction exclusively by reference to a fixed 
turnover-related criteria provides legal certainty for merging companies. The 
Commission’s suggestion of a complementary jurisdictional criteria of a deal-
size threshold could introduce further complexity to the EUMR. Also, a 
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practical aspect is that transaction value can change very fast and a merger, 
where the transaction value was a certain number in the beginning, could 
change before the deal is finalised (e.g. where shares in the acquiring 
company is considered as part of the payment. This was the case in the 
Facebook/Whatsapp merger where the final value of the acquisition rose from 
19 billion USD to 21.8 USD).169   
These aspects seem to go against the path of simplification and functioning 
of the case referral system, which has been an explained objective in the 
Commissions publications until now and what was named as one of the 
reasons for the public consultation that ended the 13th of January 2017.170  
One could assume that in order for changes like these to happen there would 
have to be a certain number of cases which would indicate the need for the 
reform. Currently there is not much public evidence of this but in the 
consultation document the Commission requests consultants to give 
information on such cases if they know of them.171 It will be interesting to see 
the results.  
Notwithstanding those possible cases, one could still argue that altering the 
turnover thresholds, and by doing so possibly reducing the legal certainty of 
the EUMR, would not be worth it. Especially if there are other changes that 
could be made that would be more coherent with the Commission’s aim of a 
more effective merger control.  
It is also important to note that if a merger falls outside the jurisdiction of the 
Commission, it doesn’t fall into some competition law void. The merger will 
still fall under the jurisdiction of the relevant NCAs and even then, the EUMR 
provides for circumstances in which cases without a Community dimension 
can be transferred to the Commission. As it currently stands, the criteria for 
deciding Community dimension, and thereby the Commission’s jurisdiction, 
is what it was supposed to be; a bright-line test which now is well-established 
and clear-cut.  
Accordingly, all changes to the current threshold system of the EUMR should 
be made with uttermost caution. Regards should also be made to not only the 
possible cases that might not fall under the EUMR but also how changes to 
the threshold criteria might affect the communities whole network of merger 
law cooperation.  
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